The future of artificial intelligence assistants is hugely uncertain, and law and economics obviously need to be expanded to include all factors related to policymaking. From a more comprehensive perspective, policies that strengthen the disclosure of artificial intelligence information, such as legislation that allows data access and retain exit, also seem promising. It is also obvious that the regulatory framework needs to be adjusted because the current disconnect between the macro and micro regulatory authorities will weaken the supervision of the automated market.
1. Transform the consumer's conversion model
We should expect the existence of powerful artificial intelligence assistants. Artificial intelligence is coming. It can guide us to shop like a car and execute transactions according to our wishes. It is also generally accepted that the law should reduce transaction costs. Law and economics scholars sometimes mention that digital intermediaries may help. Therefore, the foundation of knowledge and the real world is in place and can be transferred to a society that supports artificial intelligence.
The seeds of the automation market have been sown today. A powerful company like Amazon may technically build an automated market that suits its interests when policymakers do not understand the full costs and risks. For example, the ability of algorithms to accelerate consumer decision-making is rightly regarded as "the most basic advantage."
It is also important to recognize that this speed may cause market volatility risks and prompt management to respond inefficiently. Even if the policies supporting artificial intelligence are still reasonable, any policy analysis does not take into account negative factors, which makes the reform may not include mechanisms for monitoring market fluctuations and provide safeguards.
Therefore, even if there is no well-thought out policy, artificial intelligence assistants will appear in one form or another. It is preferable to provide a broad legal and economic framework for these developments to promote perfect competition.
2. Redesign the regulatory structure
Regulators play an important role in managing the benefits and costs associated with the acceleration of the digital market. The regulatory framework currently depends to a large extent on the self-interest of artificial intelligence assistants to determine the trajectory they will follow. The Federal Trade Commission is responsible for the management of financial institutions, while the Federal Reserve Bank is responsible for consumer finance. These institutions pay more attention to micro-level markets and personal transactions, but they do not have the mission of macro-level stability. Because artificial intelligence assistants blur the micro and macro boundaries, adjustments to trade and banking regulatory agencies are needed.
If the artificial intelligence assistant's advice to tens of millions of consumers shows signs of destabilizing the economy, give regulators a deceleration mechanism or a pause button, just like the Securities and Exchange Commission's ability to stop trading on a stock exchange. In some cases, financial institutions may be required to establish a deceleration mechanism. Even though these special devices are not the ultimate answer to the problem, they are at least a good expedient.
Although the Federal Trade Commission has reasons to adopt a more accurate economic model for the automation market, the structural changes in the agency are not solely based on an understanding of the automation market. Unlike financial regulatory agencies, the task of trade regulatory agencies is not to identify and manage economic risks that may arise in the future.
Ideally, regulators should be able to both promote policies that support artificial intelligence and manage the risks of artificial intelligence. Its functions should include consumer protection and antitrust governance, as well as broader risk supervision tasks- a large number of privacy, information access, and other threats discovered by scholars. Before any inflection point that justifies the reorganization of supervision comes, it is best for the supervisory agency to use the existing authority and expanded framework to start studying such issues in order to lay the knowledge base for future high-risk decision-making.
The Coase Theorem, information economics, and behavioral economics help to develop more accurate models to design legal systems based on how the market actually operates. This article shows that the opposite assumption may make more sense in some situations. The market will still be imperfect in some aspects. For example, there are too many competitors, but it is assumed that the market can move closer to a perfectly competitive economic model with minimal conversion costs. Once you recognize this possibility, understand why the high transaction costs still exist, and it will be very beneficial to realize that laws that help automate consumer transactions will bring considerable social benefits and controllable losses.
Regarding whether the law should affect the development trajectory of artificial intelligence assistants, there have actually been results. Some laws inadvertently hinder artificial intelligence assistants, thereby preventing theoretical market volatility and more practical large-scale social welfare. At the same time, some laws designed to help consumers, such as those that mandate consumers' online cancellation rights, may inadvertently benefit artificial intelligence assistants.
A long-term regulatory vision should start with legal reforms that actively support artificial intelligence. If the commercial market becomes more like the stock market, the costs and risks of large-scale monitoring will become very important. Regulatory tools may also converge in the future, and super-conversion may be restricted by the Securities and Exchange Commission-style stock market suspension function (fuse mechanism). In any case, bridging the current erroneous thinking of separating micro and macro issues and separating finance from the real economy will better position the regulatory framework to design a comprehensive automated market rule.
